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DRUG TESTING OF STUDENT ATHLETES: SOME
CONTRACT AND TORT IMPLICATIONS
LEROY PERNELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
The death of Len Bias' brought home to many of us the stark reality
and grim truth of both the danger and the insidious nature of illegal
drug use. For many, Bias' death symbolized modem athletics, with its
pressures and pitfalls. For others still, stereotypical images of the inner
city student-athlete, more often than not, African-American, were more
firmly entrenched by this tragedy.
Whatever the reaction to Bias' death, it is clear that it heightened
efforts across American campuses to intervene in the life of the student-
athlete. Fueled by the perception that drug use is a particular problem
for the student-athlete,2 drug testing through urinalysis has become the
order of the day.3
Universities and colleges defend drug testing as necessary to deter
the type of situation that led to the death of Bias. Academic institutions
are also quick to point out that the student-athlete readily consents to
such testing as a quidpro quo for the privilege of participating in athletics
and for the significant financial advantage of a scholarship.
The establishment of drug testing as part of the life of the student-
athlete has not been without controversy. Particular concern has been
raised where government involvement occurs in the context of state
university administered drug testing programs4 or where the quasi-gov-
ernmental nature of intercollegiate regulation imposes such testing re-
quirements. 5 Much of this concern centers on the fourth amendment
* Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University College of Law. B.A. 1971,
Franklin & Marshall College; J.D. 1974, Ohio State University College of Law.
1. Len Bias died on June 19, 1986. His death and that of Cleveland Brown's defen-
sive back Don Rogers, on June 27, 1986 sparked strong public reaction. See Reilly, When
the Cheers Turned to Tears, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 14, 1986, at 28.
2. The public perception of drug use among athletes stems from initial inquiries by
The National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") concerning the use of perform-
ance enhancing drugs in the 1970's. See Comment, Drugs, Athletes, and the NCAA: A Proposed
Rule for Mandatory Drug Testing in College Athletics, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 205 (1984). Only
in more recent years has attention turned to "recreational" drug use, i.e. marijuana and
cocaine. However, a 1985 study by the University of Michigan indicates that marijuana use
among student-athletes ranged from 25% to 35% as opposed to 42% among all students.
Cocaine use was estimated to be the same (17%) for student-athletes and non-athlete stu-
dents. W. ANDERSON AND D. MCKEAG, SUBSTANCE ABUSE HABITS OF COLLEGE STUDENT
ATHLETES, INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN (1985).
3. See Pernell, Random Drug Testing of Student Athletes By State Universities in the Wake of
Von Raab and Skinner, IJ. NAT'L SPORTS L. INST. 201 (1990).
4. Id.
5. In the fall of 1986 the NCAA enacted a comprehensive drug testing program that
requires all student-athletes participating in NCAA championship play to submit to a
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implications of drug testing as a search and seizure. Thus, private col-
leges have not faced the same level of constitutional scrutiny.6
Discussion in the past centered on the concept of consent. 7 Con-
sent is an issue often raised as the answer to fourth amendment constitu-
tional challenges.8 Consent can, however, be of significance in another
context as well. 9
Consent plays a significant role in contract and tort law. It is in this
context that very little has been discussed relative to drug testing of stu-
dent-athletes. Yet momentary reflection suggests that consent in this
classic context has a significant role to play in the brave new world of
urinalysis on demand.
Consider for a moment the typical student-athlete entering college.
In almost all cases the student is asked in his or her senior year of high
school to make significant choices concerning not only what college to
attend, but also to agree to the terms and conditions imposed by the
institution. These conditions are most often a prerequisite for obtaining
grants-in-aid or other forms of financial support. Decisions concerning
these choices and acquiescence to these conditions are most often
sought from individuals who are no more than eighteen years old.
Consent to the university requirement of drug testing is most often
required of the entering freshman prior to his or her first day on cam-
pus. Universities are particularly apt to require such testing in the high
visibility, revenue producing, intercollegiate sports.' 0
Public attention regarding athlete drug use has centered on football
and basketball. The Black student-athlete, disproportionate to his or
her presence in society, accounts for a significant percentage of the ros-
screening for use of prohibited drugs. The NCAA plan calls for the testing of athletes from
member institutions "who compete in NCAA Championships and certified post-season
football contests." NCAA Exec. Reg. 1, § 7(a). Eighty substances are included in the test-
ing protocol including psychomotor stimulants (cocaine and amphetamines), sympathomi-
metic amines, miscellaneous central nervous system stimulants, anabolic steroids,
diuretics, street drugs, including heroin and marijuana, and substances banned for partic-
ular sports. Whether or not constitutional issues are applicable to the NCAA program is
beyond the scope of this article. However, it should be noted that the NCAA was deter-
mined not to be a state actor under the fourteenth amendment in NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109
S.Ct. 454 (1988). In Tarkanian, the Court found that no state action existed as to the
NCAA, even though a state university carried out its disciplinary policy against the
plaintiff.
6. See Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. 713, 532 N.E.2d 49 (1989).
7. See Scanlan, Playing the Drug Testing Game: College Athletes, Regulatory Institutions, and
the Structure of Constitutional Argument, 62 IND. L. J. 863, 930-42 (1986-87).
8. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1977) states:
(1) One who effectively consents to conduct of another intended to invade his
interests cannot recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for harm resulting
from it.
10. The University of Illinois, Indiana University, University of Michigan, Northwest-
ern University, Ohio State University, Purdue University, and the University of Wisconsin
all have some form of drug testing. Some schools including Ohio State test all athletes. All
of the indicated schools test athletes in at least the revenue generating sports of basketball
and football. See Drug-testing a Hot Topic Among Big 10 Coaches, Chi. Tribune, Aug. 4, 1986, at
6.
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ter in these activities. This student is often poor, and perhaps poorly
prepared to resist the temptation to agree to almost anything for the
opportunity to "make it" in intercollegiate athletics.
If the issue of consent, beyond the constitutional consideration, is a
significant one then it would make some sense to explore the implication
of asking young high school students, often poorly equipped to make
intelligent or voluntary choices, to give such consent.
It is the intent of this article briefly to note some issues that may
arise concerning the enforceability of this consent as a matter of contract
law, and to consider the extent to which consent will shield the univer-
sity from tortious liability. To do this it will be necessary first to explore
the contractual nature of the relationship between the student-athlete
and the university and then to discuss the consequences of enforcement
of such a relationship. The tort law analysis of consent will examine the
public policy implications of allowing consent to serve as a barrier to
liability for the intrusive nature of drug testing. Finally the article ex-
plores ways of eliminating "questionable" consent and of allowing for
the administration of drug testing in an environment in which free, intel-
ligent choice exists.
II. THE STUDENT-ATHLETE AND THE UNIVERSITY - THE CONTRACTUAL
LINK
The legal relationship between the student-athlete and the univer-
sity is, to some extent, a smaller part of the larger question of the rela-
tionship between the university and students in general. Traditionally
the courts were reluctant to interfere with academic relationships.' I So-
cial changes during the past forty years have caused the legal system to
pay closer attention to issues pertaining to the business and administra-
tive function of the university. These changes, particularly in the areas
of civil rights and consumer protection, have brought about increased
concern regarding student rights, and in particular, the student's
status. 12
11. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968), the Court states:
Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the Nation
raises problems requiring care and restraint.... By and large, public education in
our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities. Courts do
not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily
operation of school systems ....
This doctrine of academic abstention, by which courts have deferred to educators and
administrators, as applied in the university context is discussed in depth in Nordin, The
Contract to Educate: Toward a More Workable Theory of the Student-University Relationship, 8J. C.
& U. L. 141 (1981-1982).
12. Sweat v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) represented a major undermining of Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In unanimously finding that an all black law school was
unequal in facilities, curriculum, reputation and professional opportunity, to the then all
white University of Texas, Sweat served as the forerunner of Brown v. Board of Ed. of
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Civil rights concerns also served as a basis for judicial scru-
tiny of university operation in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)
and the earlier cases of Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) and Sipuel
v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Ed., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
1990]
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The theories initially relied on for judicial intervention grew, in
large part, from the involvement of the state in education. Thus, early
cases focused on due process as it applied to state-run or state-spon-
sored schools. 13 However, attempts to apply the same due process prin-
ciples to private institutions have met with little success. 1
4
In response to the difficulties in applying across the board due pro-
cess analysis, courts have offered various other theories for determining
the rights and duties between the student and the university.1 5
Contract theory is the most popular method used to support stu-
dent claims against colleges. In Perett v. State of Montana,16 the court
described the theory by reference to a Notre Dame Lawyer note 17 which
stated in part:
This contract is conceived of as one by which the student
agrees to pay all required fees, maintain the prescribed level of
academic achievement, and observe the school's disciplinary
regulations, in return for which the school agrees to allow the
(1961) is often thought to be the first modern case recognizing a judicial willingness to
intercede in the relationship between a student and the educational system. In Dixon, the
court noted that in regard to expulsion, the student must be given the rudimentary trap-
pings of due process. For a more complete discussion of the growth ofjudicial interven-
tion see Nordin, supra note 11,. at 142.
13. The issue of whether the activities of a state school are state action for purposes of
constitutional analysis was resolved by the Supreme Court's analysis in New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). In T.L.O., the Court found that a search conducted by a state
high school principal was state action for purposes of the fourth amendment. Further, the
Court recognized the application of due process to the state campus in Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975) (requiring due process in suspension and expulsion proceedings) and
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (applying due process to the administration of
corporeal punishment).
14. In Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967) the court held that,
"[i]t is clear ... that the principle ... that a Government college or university may not
expel its students without notice of charges and an opportunity to be heard, is not applica-
ble to Howard University, for it is not a public institution nor does it partake of any gov-
ernmental character." Id. at 612. See also Krohn v. Harvard Law School, 552 F.2d 21 (1st
Cir. 1977).
15. Professor Nordin indicates that theories ofloco parentis and fiduciary relationships,
among others, have been used to describe the relationship between the student and the
university. Nordin, supra note 11, n.5.
The loco parentis theory suggests that the university serves in the place of the parent
and can exercise the control that a parent could when dealing with their child. See Gott v.
Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913). Such a theory has obvious drawbacks in
a modern higher education context where the age of majority is achieved at eighteen, and
where even minors are recognized as persons for purposes of individual rights. Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
The "fiduciary" theory is illustrated by the language in People ex rel. Tinkoff v. North-
western University, 333 Ill. App. 224, 77 N.E.2d 345 (1947) in which the petitioner sought
mandamus to require his admission to the university. The petitioner contended that the
university wag a private corporation "entrusted" with a public interest as evidenced by its
charter granted by the legislature. This argument was rejected as was the petition for
mandamus.
16. 464 F. Supp. 784, 786 (D. Mont. 1979), revd on other grounds, 661 F.2d 756 (1981).
In Peretti students of an aviation technology course brought suit regarding the termination,
due to budget cuts, of their course. The court held that an implied contract existed be-
tween the parties that could be enforced as a protected right under the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.
17. Note, Expulsion of College and Professional Students - Rights and Remedies, 38 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 174 (1963).
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student to pursue his course of studies and be granted a di-
ploma upon successful completion thereof.' 8
Although such contracts are seldom in writing, the court accepted
the notion that the existence of the contracts is implied, and that the
terms can be found in the university bulletins and through the custom
and usages within academia. 19
Similarly, in Lowenthal v. Vanderbilt University,20 the court found that
the doctrine of academic abstention was inapplicable where the allega-
tion is one of breach of contract.
2
'
The contract theory as a basis for judicial intervention, while used
often, has not escaped criticism. The contract theory has been criticized
as inappropriate because the student-university relationship does not re-
flect "a true bargaining and promise orientation ' 22 associated within
the classic theory of contract. It is apparent that the application of con-
tract theory reflects in many instances a disguised attempt to apply prin-
ciples of due process to both public and private settings.
2 3
18. Id. at 183.
19. See also Krasnow v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 414 F. Supp. 55 (W.D. Va. 1976);
Papish v. Board of Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 331 F. Supp. 1321 (W.D. Mo. 1971),
aff'd, 464 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1972); Andersen v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 531 (1972); Balogun v. Cornell Univ., 70 Misc. 2d 474, 333 N.Y.S.2d 838 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1971).
20. No. A-8525 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Davidson County Aug. 15, 1977). Discussed in detail
in Note, Educating Misguided Student Athletes: An Application of Contract Theory, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 96, 108-09 (1985).
21. The case arose from the student/plaintiff allegation that the failure of the univer-
sity to provide an announced innovative program within the Graduate School of Manage-
ment, breached a contract to provide competent educational services. Once again, the
court found that contract terms may be implied from the school's bulletin, doctoral studies
guidelines, and other official statements.
22. Dodd, The Non-Contractual Nature of the Student- University Contractual Relationship, 33
KAN. L. REV. 701, 730 (1985). Professor Dodd argues that "the lack of a true business,
bargained-for relationship between student and educational institution is a major reason
why contractually based analysis is not fully appropriate .. " Id. at 704. As evidence of
this, the article points out that the traditional rules of offer and acceptance do not fit the
university setting. Student expectations of performance, in Professor Dodd's view, do not
normally rise to the traditional strength necessary to constitute contractual promise. Id. at
724.
Despite her criticism, Professor Dodd does note that the modern law characterizes the
relationship between student and university as primarily contractual. Id. at 702.
23. The early cases of contract law application to the student-university relationship,
often involved matters of discipline which today would be resolved, in the public institu-
tional setting, as a matter of due process. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Due
process on the campus is not, however, unlimited. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mis-
souri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (restricted to non-academic decisions); see Note,
Contract Law and the Student-University Relationship, 48 IND. L.J. 253, 265-67 (1972) (inappli-
cability to the private campus).
Typical of contract approach to disciplinary issues is Goldstein v. New York Univer-
sity, wherein the court states:
But obviously, and of necessity, there is implied in such contract a term or condi-
tion that the student will not be guilty of such misconduct as would be subversive
of the discipline of the college or school, or as would show him to be morally unfit
to be continued as a member thereof. The power of suspension or expulsion of
students is an attribute of government of educational institutions. It was ample in
this case.
76 A.D. 80, 83, 78 N.Y.S. 739, 740-41 (1902).
1990]
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Whatever uncertainty may be raised by the student-university rela-
tionship in general, it is certain that the relationship between the univer-
sity and the student-athlete is indeed contractual.
A student-athlete certifies his intent to attend a NCAA member in-
stitution by executing a National Letter of Intent ("Letter").24 The Let-
ter obligates the student to attend only the indicated institution. Any
enrollment in another institution within one year of the execution of the
Letter results in intercollegiate ineligibility for two years, unless the ini-
tial institution formally releases the student. 2 5 The bargained for ex-
change is the offering of financial aid.
The National Letter of Intent serves as the athlete's acceptance of
the university's offer. By signing, the athlete accepts the specific terms
that are in the Letter, as well as those that are part of the previous
course of dealings between the college and the student-athlete.
In Taylor v. Wake Forest University,2 6 in what is considered to be the
leading case on the issue, 27 the court held that the relationship between
a student-athlete and the university was contractual. In Taylor, the plain-
tiff received a football scholarship contingent on his compliance with the
rules of the Atlantic Coast Conference, the NCAA and Wake Forest Uni-
versity. Both the university and the athletic associations required that
Taylor attend practice sessions in order to maintain his eligibility.
Because of poor grades Taylor quit the football team after his fresh-
man year. As a result, Taylor's scholarship was cancelled. The failure of
Taylor to participate in football was the reason given for termination.
In an action brought to recover the cost of Taylor's subsequent ed-
ucation, 28 the court found that the relationship between the university
and the student-athlete was contractual, and that "in consideration of
the scholarship award, [Taylor] agreed to maintain his athletic eligibility,
and this meant both physically and scholastically. ' 2 9 Because Taylor
breached this contract by failing to attend practice, the court held that
the university was not liable for its promise to provide a scholarship.
The court found that the terms of the contract were drawn not only from
the grant-in-aid application filed by the plaintiffs3" but also from oral
24. The National Letter of Intent program was devised by the NCAA to deter "school
jumping." See Sturrup v. Mahan, 290 N.E.2d 64, 68 (Ind. 1972). The Letter indicates the
adverse consequences that may befall the student who attempts to attend, within the pro-
hibited period any school other than the one named in the Letter.
25. NCAA Bylaw l-2-(a)-(2)-(vi) (1988).
26. 16 N.C. App. 117, 191 S.E.2d 379 (1972), cert. denied,' 192 S.E.2d 197 (1972).
27. See G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH ANDJ. TRENTADUE, SPORTS LAW 40 (1986).
28. Interestingly, the plaintiff sought recovery apparently for "wrongful termination"
of the athletic scholarship. As such the action would appear to sound in tort as well as
contract. See Woods and Mills, Tortious Interference with an Athletic Scholarship: A University's
Remedy for the Unscrupulous Sports Agent, 40 ALA. L. REV. 141 (1988).
29. 16 N.C. App. at 120-22, 191 S.E.2d at 382.
30. The application entitled, "Atlantic Coast Conference Application.For A Football
Grant-In-Aid Or A Scholarship" stated in part: "This Grant if awarded, will be for 4 years
provided I conduct myself in accordance with the rules of the Conference, the NCAA, and
the Institution. I agree to maintain eligibility, for intercollegiate athletics under both Con-
ference and Institutional rules." Id. at 380.
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agreements entered into between the plaintiffs and Wake Forest.3 '
In Begley v. Corporation of Mercer University,32 the court again found
that a contract existed between the plaintiff Begley, a basketball player,
and the university. Begley received a grant-in-aid in exchange for his
participation in the basketball program. The university withdrew its
scholarship award after discovering a miscalculation of Begley's high
school average. In finding that the university was entitled to rescind its
promise to provide a scholarship, the court read into the terms of the
contract the NCAA requirement that grant-in-aid awards may only be
made to students with entering averages higher than that of the
plaintiff.
3 3
Taylor and Begley both support the contention that the relationship
between the university and the student-athlete is contractual since ath-
letic services are offered in exchange for a scholarship. Such a contract
can be implied and will be interpreted in light of the expectations and
promises of the parties.3 4
The recognition of the contractual relationship between the stu-
dent-athlete and the university, both as a matter of express and implied
contract, is more easily achieved than the recognition of the same rela-
tionship between the university and the student body generally. As
stated in the Columbia Law Review
The terms and conditions by which a student athlete goes to
college are markedly different from those that govern the gen-
eral student body. First, non-athlete students are under no
specific written contract to follow the rules and regulations of
the university. Student athletes, on the other hand, are under
written obligation, the terms of which are specified in both the
National Letter of Intent, which compels attendance at the des-
ignated institution, and the financial aid statement, which stipu-
31. Weistart and Lowell raise the issue of whether the recognition of a contract based
on a financial aid award violates the concept of amateurism and in addition note: "If an
award is granted in exchange for participation, the arrangement could be viewed as a voca-
tional arrangement - that is, as compensation for personal services. And if the award is
compensation for services, then the athlete might also be an 'employee' of the institution
for workmen's compensation purposes." J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS
11 (1979).
For further discussion of the concept of the student-athlete as an employee see, Uni-
versity of Denver v. Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 432 (Colo. 1953) (injured football
player was an employee for purposes of workmen's compensation); Van Horn v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1963) (football player killed in a plane accident
while returning from a game held to be an employee for family compensation purposes).
32. 367 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
33. Id.
34. The rationale of Taylor and Begley has been followed in practically all cases that
have since litigated the rights and responsibilities between student-athletes and the univer-
sity. See Gulf South Conference v. Boyd, 369 So.2d 553 (Ala. 1979). The court stated:
It should be noted that the relationship between a college athlete who accepts an
athletic scholarship and the college which awards such an athletic scholarship is
contractual in nature. The college athlete agrees to participate in a sport at the
college, and the college in return agrees to give assistance to the athlete. The
athlete also agrees to be bound by the rules and regulations adopted by the col-
lege concerning the financial assistance.
Id. at 558.
1990]
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lates the specific terms and conditions of the scholarship.
These documents impose rules and regulations upon the stu-
dent athlete in excess of those ordinarily implicit in the rela-
tionship between the university and the non-athlete student. 35
If the special relationship between a college and a student-athlete is
contractual in nature, of what significance is a required consent to drug
testing in the overall contractual relationship?
A. Consent to Drug Testing as a Contractual Term
Terms of a contract may be implied as well as specifically stated.
Terms may be implied from the surrounding circumstances, the stan-
dard terms and the history of the course of dealings between the par-
ties. 36 In the student-college relationship it is traditional for the terms
of the contract to be derived not only from expressed agreements be-
tween the parties but from other documents expressing intent - such as
the college catalog. 3 7 The contractual relationship between the student-
athlete and the university builds upon this general approach by includ-
ing all documents, agreements and rules that evidence the responsibili-
ties of each party to the other.38
The typical consent to drug testing required by university athletic
programs is the type of agreement or term that is implicitly part of the
contract between the student-athlete and the university. 39 The language
of such consent is exemplified by the forms used by Ohio State Univer-
sity4 0 and the University of Illinois. 4 1
The Ohio State form emphasizes that the student's consent to drug
35. Note, Educating Misguided Student Athletes: An Application of Contract Theory, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 96, 104 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
36. J. CALAMARI ANDJ. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 56 (3d ed. 1987); A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS 525 (1952).
37. Davenport, The Catalog in the Courtroom: From Shield to Sword?, 12J.C.U.L. 201, 206
(1985) states: "Beginning in the 1890's, courts have held that the relationship between a
college and its students is fundamentally a contractual one and that the school's catalog is
the main document setting forth the terms of the legal contract."(footnotes omitted).
38. Thus in Taylor, 16 N.C. App. at 117, 191 S.E.2d at 379 (1972) the contract terms
were derived from the rules of the Atlantic Coast Conference and the NCAA as well as the
grant-in-aid application signed by the plaintiff. In Begley, 367 F. Supp. at 908 (E.D. Tenn.
1973) Begley's failure to obtain the requisite high school grade point average implicitly
breached the rules of the NCAA and Mercer University which were read as part of the
contract. In Gulf South Conference v. Boyd, 369 So.2d 553 (Ala. 1979) the court enforced
the athletic association by-laws regarding the transfer of students as part of the contract
between the student and the university.(The court held that the university could not de-
clare the student ineligible because of a transfer from one conference school to another.).
See also Barile v. University of Virginia, 2 Ohio App.3d 233, 441 N.E.2d 608 (Ohio Ct. App.
1981) (finding that the Interconference Letter of Intent evidenced and was part of the
contract between the university and the student-athlete).
Of particular significance to this article is Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. 713,
532 N.E.2d 49 (1989). Student-athlete Bally refused to sign the consent to drug test and
was not allowed to participate in the track program. The university prevailed on its claim
of breach of contract because of the student's refusal to sign the Northeastern University
and NCAA consent forms.
39. See Batty, 403 Mass. 713, 532 N.E.2d 49.
40. See Appendix A.
41. See Appendix B.
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testing is "in consideration for the opportunity to participate in intercol-
legiate athletics at The Ohio State University.''42 The Illinois program,
while not using the classic consideration term for contractual intent,
speaks of consent as the bargained for exchange required for athletic
competition.
43
Required consent as the quid pro quo for the receipt of a benefit -
particularly where the delivery of a personal service is involved - is tra-
ditionally found to be an implicit term of contract. Thus in Larsen v.
Motor Supply Company,44 the court enforced as a term in a contract for at-
will employment, the employer's standardized consent form for a psy-
chological stress evaluation test.
However, if we accept drug testing consent requirements as implied
contractual terms, whether and to what extent such terms will be judi-
cially enforced, must be determined. Such a determination involves an
evaluation of contractual rules pertaining to the intent of the parties as
well as those rules concerning the enforceability of the terms. In this
regard it is necessary to examine the application of traditional rules of
contract avoidance including duress, undue influence and uncon-
scionability.
1. Drug Testing Consent and the Doctrine of Duress
The concept of duress speaks to the free will of a party entering into
a contractual agreement. 45 The modern rule is "that any wrongful act
or threat which overcomes the free will of a party constitutes duress."
46
The determination of free will, for contract purposes, is made by look-
ing to the particular person and determining if that person's will has
been overcome. 4 7 In the context of the student-athlete it must be deter-
mined if the university, through a wrongful act or threat, has overcome
the will of the student-athlete at the time of requiring consent.
48
Duress also turns on whether the coercive party is unjustly en-
riched. In this context the issue of whether intercollegiate athletics ex-
ploit the athlete for the economic gain of the university is particularly
germane.4 9
42. See Appendix A.
43. The Illinois form states:
I also understand that my participation in intercollegiate athletics is conditioned
upon my full and good faith participation and cooperation in all aspects of the
program including testing, education, counselling and rehabilitation. See Appen-
dix B.
44. 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977).
45. Kaplan v. Kaplan, 25 Il1. 2d 181, 185 N.E.2d 706, 709 (1962).
46. J. CALAMARI ANDJ. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 337 (3d ed. 1987).
47. See Silsbee v. Webber, 171 Mass. 378, 50 N.E. 555 (1898).
48. The age and sophistication of the student-athlete has an important role to play in
determining the strength of his or her will. In 1980, 72.6% of entering freshmen were 18
years old. Only 6% were 20 or over. Dodd, The Non-Contractual Nature of the Student-Univer-
sity Contractual Relationship, 33 KAN. L. REV. 701, 715 (1985).
49. There seems to be little question that the economic benefit of athletics to the
university far exceeds any economic gain of the unpaid student-athlete. See McKenzie and
Sullivan, Does the NCAA Exploit College Athletes? An Economic and Legal Reinterpretation, 32 AN-
TITRUST BULL. 373 (1987); Yasser, Are Scholarship Athletes At Big-Time Programs Really Univer-
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But most importantly, duress requires that the act or threat be
wrongful. 50 Regarding requiring drug testing consent, two issues are
raised concerning the "wrongfulness" of the university's activity or
threat.
First, by requiring the student-athlete to consent to drug testing
under pain of loss of scholarship or non-participation, the university
forces the student to waive significant constitutional and common law
rights to privacy. 5 1 Such a forced waiver, at least in terms of the state
university, may well be wrongful because of the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions.5 2
Second, the modern trend in determining duress emphasizes the
exercise of a legal right "in oppressive or abusive ways" 53 as Calamari
and Perillo state in describing an employee who may legally be fired
without cause:
[A] threat to fire him unless he agrees to sell his shares of stock
in the employing corporation back to the employer constitutes
an abuse of the employer's rights and the employee who suc-
cumbs to the threat may recover his shares if the trier of fact
finds that the employee had been coerced by threat.
5 4
Like the employee above, the student-athlete, although not entitled
to a scholarship or to intercollegiate competition, may be the victim of
duress if his or her consent to drug testing is obtained by threat of loss
of those privileges.
sity Employees?-You Bet They Are !, 9 BLACK L.J. 65 (1984); Note, Compensation for Collegiate
Athletes: A Runfor More Than The Roses, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 701 (1985).
50. The Restatement of Contracts addresses what may constitute wrongful threats for
purposes of duress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 (1979) (regarding
when duress by physical compulsion prevents formation of a contract), RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 (1) (1979) (regarding when a threat is improper) and in particu-
lar, for purposes of this article, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 (2) (1979)
which provides:
A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms, and
(a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not significantly
benefit the party making the threat,
(b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation of assent is
significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making the threat,
or
(c) what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for intellegitimate ends.
51. See Pernell, supra note 3. As to the common law right to privacy and drug testing
at the private university. See Bally v. Northeastern University, 403 Mass. 713, 532 N.E.2d
49 (1989).
52. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has its roots in the 1925 decision of
Frost Trucking Co. v. Railway Comm'n., 271 U.S. 583 (1925):
It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state,
having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as
it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited;
and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditiofis which require the
relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of
one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel
the surrender of all. It is conceivable that the guaranties embedded in the Consti-
tution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.
Id. at 593-94.
53. J. CALAMARI ANDJ. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 340 (3d ed. 1987).
54. Id. at 340.
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If duress exists, the remedy for the student is to void the contract.5 5
In this instance only the contract provision for consent to drug testing
need be voided. In addition, the student may invoke the equitable juris-
diction of the court to reform the contract or to grant such other equita-
ble relief as may be required. 56
2. Drug Testing Consent and the Doctrine of Undue Influence
Undue influence as an equitable concept was developed as a means
of setting aside a contractual agreement imposed by a dominant party
upon a subservient one.5 7 Unlike duress it requires no proof of a
wrongful act or a threat. Instead, what must be shown is that one party
used its superior psychological position to induce the subservient party
to consent to an agreement that the latter would not have otherwise con-
sented to. 58
Calamari and Perillo speak of four elements that make a prima facie
case of undue influence: 59 (1) susceptibility of the party influenced; (2)
evidence of the opportunity to exercise influence; (3) evidence of a dis-
position to exercise undue influence; and (4) evidence of the unnatural
nature of the transaction. Applied to the requiring of drug testing con-
sent, undue influence appears to have validity.
The mental status of the influenced party plays a significant role in
determining susceptibility. The young high school athlete presents a
mentally vulnerable subject. It is hard to imagine a more impressiona-
ble person than an eighteen year-old high school student-athlete with-
out prior experience asserting individual rights. It is ironic that the very
universities which have questioned the academic preparation of the high
school athlete,60 now expect the same student to demonstrate the
mental maturity necessary to bargain and consent on an issue as com-
plex as drug testing.
The opportunity to exercise undue influence normally connotes a
confidential relationship. 6 1 It is unclear whether the confidentiality
often alleged to exist in a university drug testing program qualifies as
the type of relationship conducive to undue influence. Even if it does
not, the relationship between a school and a student may still meet the
requirement of undue influence.
55. Id. at 349.
56. Id. at 349-50.
57. J. CALAMARI ANDJ. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 351 (3d ed. 1987).
58. Id. at 352.
59. Id. at 352-53. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (1979).
60. At the NCAA annual convention in 1981 amendments purporting to "restore aca-
demic credibility to the postsecondary career of the student athlete" were adopted. Wid-
ener, Suits by Student-Athletes Against Colleges for Obstructing Educational Opportunity, 24 ARiz. L.
REV. 467 (1982). These amendments followed in the wake of documentation of the educa-
tional shortcomings of many college athletes. See Axthelm, The Shame of College Sports,
NEWSWEEK, September 22, 1980, at 50, and Sanoff, Big-Time College Sports: Behind Scandals,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., April 5, 1982, at 60.
61. See Note, Use of Non-confidential Relationship Undue Influence in Contract Recision, 49
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 631, 632-33 (1974).
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In Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District,6 2 the coerced resignation of a
school teacher for unproven homosexual activity was found to be the
product of undue influence. The teacher was weakened by forty hours
without sleep. The court stated: "The difference between legitimate
persuasion and excessive pressure, like the difference between seduction
and rape, rests to a considerable extent in the manner in which the par-
ties go about their business."
6 3
If the teacher can succumb to the coercion then so can the student.
Like the teacher in Odorizzi, the student is often faced with the demand
that consent be given at once and without question. Like the teacher,
the student lacks an advisor and may not have the opportunity to consult
anyone other than a parent who may know even less than the student
about dealing with the forces of higher education.
Third, the fact that the university almost always takes the initiative
in both contacting the student and in requesting consent is significant
evidence of a disposition to exercise undue influence. 64 Finally, the un-
natural nature of the transaction is evidenced by the uniqueness of drug
testing. The current public attention regarding drug use and the inti-
mate nature of the testing procedure, make consent to urinalysis a
strange transaction indeed.
As with duress, the remedy for undue influence in drug testing con-
sent lies in equity. The student that successfully establishes this claim
may void that provision of the contract or demand that the scholarship
portion be specifically performed.
3. Consent to Drug Test and Unconscionability
Perhaps the contract doctrine most suitable to drug testing consent
analysis is unconscionability. Unconscionability is a concept that,
although defying precise definition, 6 5 prevents the enforcement of con-
tracts or contract clauses that are grossly one-sided. In Weaver v. Ameri-
can Oil Company,6 6 one of the leading cases on the doctrine, the court
held that if the substantial burden of the contract or clause is on a party
in a weaker bargaining position, the superior party must demonstrate "a
real and voluntary meeting of the minds and not merely an objective
meeting."67
Superior bargaining power, while alone not sufficient to make a
contract unconscionable, will result in the provision being struck if there
62. 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1966).
63. Id. at 134, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
64. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 55, at 353.
65. Calamari and Perillo state: " 'Unconscionable' is a word that defies lawyer-like
definition. It is a term borrowed from moral philosophy and ethics. As close to a defini-
tion as we are likely to get is 'that which affronts the sense of decency.' " Id. at 406 (quot-
ing Gimble Bros., Inc. v. Swift, 62 Misc. 2d 156, 307 N.Y.S.2d 952 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970)).
66. 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 1971).
67. Id. at 464, 276 N.E.2d at 148.
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is a lack of meaningful choice. 68 The typical student-athlete often
presents the classic example of a weak bargaining position with no
meaningful choice. The student-athlete is totally dependent on the uni-
versity for financial aid. As a result of the Letter of Intent, 69 the student
may not market his or her skills to other institutions without severe pen-
alties. The mandatory nature of drug testing consent and the wide-
spread existence of programs throughout the major institutions, leaves
the student with no realistic choice but to sign.
Closely aligned with substantive unconscionability is the modem in-
terpretation of contracts of adhesion. 70 Although the concept of adhe-
sion developed primarily as a response to the general common law
"duty to read,"' 7 1 modern courts have found that such contracts may be
unconscionable, even if technically "read." In Weaver v. American Oil Co.,
after finding the contract to be one of adhesion the court stated:
When a party can show ... the contract ... to be ... an uncon-
scionable one, due to a prodigious amount of bargaining power
on behalf of the stronger party, which is used to the stronger
party's advantage and is unknown to the lesser party,. . . the
contract provision, or the contract as a whole, if the provision is
not separable, should not be enforceable on the grounds that
the provision is contrary to public policy. 7 2
The student-university contractual relationship has been compared
to a contract of adhesion by several commentators. 73 Courts also have
viewed the relationship between the college and the student in adhesion
terms. 74 As Professor Dodd notes, the nature of the written materials
setting forth the contract terms lend themselves to classic adhesion
analysis:
[T]he various written materials that constitute the contract be-
tween student and university, a school's catalogues, circulars
68. See Campbell Soup v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir. 1948); Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
69. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
70. The term contract of adhesion refers to standardized, pre-printed contracts,
merely providing blanks to be filled in or signed by the non-drafting party. See Kessler,
Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629
(1943).
71. The traditional duty to read rule indicates that a party who signs an agreement is
deemed by their actions to have read and understood the document. See Ricketts v. Penn-
sylvania R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757 (2nd Cir. 1946). In contracts of adhesion, courts have
found the duty to read to be inapplicable where the "clause was in fine print and contained
no title heading . Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 461, 276 N.E.2d 144,
147 (Ind. 1971).
72. 257 Ind. at 464, 276 N.E.2d at 148. See also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
73. Dodd, The Non-Contractual Nature of the Student-University Contractual Relationship, 33
U. KAN. L. REV. 701, 714 (1985); Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students-A
Fiduciary Theory, 54 Ky. L.J. 643 (1966);Jennings, Breach of Contract Suits by Students Against
Postsecondary Education Institutions: Can They Succeed?, 7 J.C.U.L. 191 (1980-81).
74. See Corso v. Creighton Univ., 731 F.2d 529, 533 (8th Cir. 1984). "[T~he contract is
on a printed form prepared by one party, and adhered to by another who has little or no
bargaining power .. " See also K.D. v. Educational Testing Serv., 87 Misc. 2d 657, 386
N.Y.S.2d 747, 751-52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
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and bulletins, are not drafted to be contracts. The information
so disseminated is written most often by school administrators,
not lawyers, and one wonders if the drafters themselves, much
less student readers, perceive that the documents are contrac-
tual materials. At least the typical consumer who must sign a
contract of adhesion, although she may not comprehend nor
truly agree to the terms it contains, is presumably aware that
the proffered document is a legal instrument creating certain
duties on the part of both parties. 75
The plight of the student-athlete is even greater. Included in the
various materials such as catalogs and bulletins are rules and regulations
of the respective university specifically aimed at athletes and rules and
requirements of the various athletic associations. Very seldom are the
forms associated with these materials, including the drug testing consent
form, explained to the student as legal documents containing binding
contractual terms.
Dodd also points out that the public policy concern over oppression
is enhanced by the youth of the subservient party.76 Although most stu-
dents are past the age of majority upon entering college, they still lack
the life experience necessary to make intelligent contractual decisions. 77
B. Avoiding Contractual Problems in Obtaining Drug Testing Consent
The foregoing discussion suggests that the current practices relat-
ing to obtaining consent for drug testing create potentially serious con-
tractual problems. The private school can no longer breathe a sigh of
relief because it has avoided the constitutional problems faced by its sis-
ter state university. 78
However, the contractual problems raised are not necessarily insur-
mountable. There are several courses of action that a college concerned
with the rejection of its drug testing consent program can pursue.
First, recognition of the source of contractual difficulty is essential.
The concept of oppression is the central concern of duress, undue influ-
ence and unconscionability. Removing oppression from the drug test-
ing consent process is thus the primary goal of any attempt to prevent a
voidable contract.
Oppression in drug testing is characterized as the invasion of a stu-
dent's substantial rights by denying him the opportunity to choose be-
tween options. Severe penalties for non-consent, and the absence of a
reliable source of information and advice for the student called upon to
make the choice, also results in oppression.
Second, choice and relief from severe penalty and advice are both
factors that can be addressed by concerted university action. Choice,
sufficient to remove oppression, may be accomplished by making drug
75. Dodd, supra note 73, at 714-15.
76. Dodd, supra note 73, at 715.
77. Cf. Ryan v. Hofstra Univ., 67 Misc. 2d 651, 324 N.Y.S.2d 964 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
78. See Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. 713, 532 N.E.2d 49 (1989).
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testing truly voluntary. Proponents of mandatory drug testing might
claim that a truly voluntary program would not work as a deterrence for
those involved with drug use. However, a student-athlete involved with
one of the "major" sports lives under constant scrutiny. His or her con-
duct is monitored by other students, faculty and the media. The stu-
dent-athlete, recognizing the importance of image may be highly
motivated to demonstrate a "clean bill of health" without being re-
quired to provide urine on demand.
Universities might also consider the possibility of not making schol-
arships contingent on consenting to drug testing. In addition to provid-
ing an opportunity for choosing to submit to testing, such an approach
has the added advantage of not coupling the relinquishment of the right
not to be tested with the contractual consideration, scholarship. An al-
ternative "penalty" might be to link drug testing solely with intercollegi-
ate competition. It has long been recognized that the student-athlete
has no vested right to compete and such is not the basis of the
contract.
79
Finally, the use of an independent advisor would meet the concern
expressed in Odorizzi,80 providing a shield against undue influence, and
would also allow the student to make an informed choice. The concept
of an advisor does not necessarily mean a lawyer. 8 ' However, the com-
plexity of the issue may well require not only an adult, but also a person
with a fair amount of sophistication.
While the above might be a good starting point for evaluating drug
testing, it in no way guarantees that such programs will be risk free for
the university. In addition to the uncertainty as to whether contract law
hurdles may be overcome, there are some questions of tort liability that
have not received much consideration.
III. SOME COMMON LAw TORT IMPLICATIONS OF DRUG TESTING
Consent has significance in tort as well as contract. 8 2 Valid consent
can protect the university from tort liability.83
79. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Gillard, 352 So.2d 1072 (Miss. 1977);
Colorado Seminary v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo.
1976), aff'd, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1978).
80. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
81. The onerous nature of the student-school contract was, of course, greatly
lessened in previous eras when the contract frequently was between the parent
and the school. A person who is a parent would be an older person and presuma-
bly more aware than a student would be of the nature of the contractual relation-
ship with the school.
Dodd, supra note 73, at 717.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 (1977) provides:
(i) Consent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur. It may be manifested by
action or inaction and need not be communicated to the actor.
(2) If words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended as
consent, they constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1977) states:
(i) One who effectively consents to conduct of another intended to invade his
interests cannot recover in an action of tort for the conduct or harm resulting
from it.
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Drug testing exposes the university to liability that far exceeds mere
negligence.8 4 While constitutional liability is problematic, 8 5 the sensi-
tive nature of the information gathered and the privacy interest of the
test subject create a significant potential for liability in many jurisdic-
tions if confidentiality is not strictly maintained.86
The effect of a signed consent for drug testing on potential liability
for invasion of privacy under the common law is an area of inquiry that
has to date been neglected. In light of the widespread use of drug tests,
the potential for liability in this area should be considered.
A. The Common Law Right to Privacy and Drug Testing
Of the existing causes of action in tort, common law claims of inva-
sion of privacy present the greatest likelihood of liability for the uni-
versity.8 7 Privacy, or the right to be let alone, is the student-athlete's
interest that is most jeopardized by mandatory drug testing. 88
The right to privacy, as a common law cause of action, is a concept
which includes four distinct claims. 8 9 Of these four, the two that are
particularly relevant to drug testing are: (1) unreasonable intrusion
(2) To be effective, consent must be
(a) by one who has the capacity to consent or by a person empowered to
consent for him, and
(b) to the particular conduct, or to substantially the same conduct.
(3) Conditional consent or consent restricted as to time, area or in other respects
is effective only within the limits of the condition or restriction.
(4) If the actor exceeds the consent, it is not effective for the excess.
(5) Upon termination of consent its effectiveness is terminated, except as it may
have become irrevocable by contract or otherwise, or except as its terms may
include, expressly or by implication, a privilege to continue to act.
84. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detail the always existing poten-
tial for liability that may occur as a result of physical injury or mistaken findings that are
the product of negligent administration of the testing procedure.
85. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (1989); Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (1989) (allowed the drug testing of
employees of the government, or who were subject to government regulation, thus open-
ing the door to constitutional drug testing).
86. The common law now recognizes that physical intrusion into the solitude or pri-
vate affairs of another is actionable as an invasion of privacy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B (1977). Liability also exists for the public disclosure of private facts. Santi-
esteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962). Invasion of privacy
claims such as these, and as discussed infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text, should not
be confused with constitutional invasion of privacy claims arising under federal or state
constitutions. See Note, The NCAA Drug-Testing Program and the California Constitution: Has
California Expanded the Right of Privacy?, 23 U.S.F. L. REV. 253 (1989).
87. Liability for negligence based causes of action are of course a real possibility, par-
ticularly if erroneous test results are generated. See Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps.,
27 Cal.3d 916, 616 P.2d 813 (1980) (defendant hospital was liable for negligent inflection
of emotional distress as a resul " of erroneous interpretation of venereal disease test).
88. See, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890):
[Mian, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to pub-
licity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual;
but modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy,
subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by
mere bodily injury.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977) states:
(1) one who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the
resulting harm to the interests of the other.
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upon the seclusion of another, and (2) unreasonable publicity given to
the other's private life.
Intrusion upon seclusion requires proof that the defendant inten-
tionally intrudes upon the private affairs of others in a way that would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.9 0
In Bednarik v. Bednarik,9 1 the right to privacy principle was applied
to invalidate an illegal compulsory blood test. Bednarik involved an ac-
tion where the petitioner sought a court ordered blood test of both par-
ties and a minor child. In denying the request the court found that "to
subject a person against his will to a blood test is ... clearly an invasion
of his personal privacy." '92
O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of America, Inc. 93 also upheld the application of
this theory of invasion of privacy to a testing situation. Interestingly, for
purposes of this article, the plaintiff brought suit for invasion of privacy
after his employer forced the plaintiff, under threat of being fired, to
take a polygraph examination relating to alleged drug use.
Applied to the drug testing of student-athletes, there can be little
doubt that urinalysis, the preferred method of testing, involves an intru-
sion into a classic area of seclusion. Nor can there be any question that
reasonable people would find the observation of urination and collec-
tion of one's urine by another, for non-medical purposes, to be highly
offensive as the court stated in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private
than the passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphe-
misms if they talk about it at all. It is a function traditionally
performed without observation; indeed, its performance in
public is generally prohibited by law as well as social custom. 9 4
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in sec.
652B; or
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness, as stated in sec. 652C; or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, as stated in
§ 652D; or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the
public, as stated in sec. 652E.
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1976) states: One who intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
In Housh v. Peth, 135 N.E.2d 440, 450 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955) the court defined the cause
of action as one where there is "wrongful intrusion into one's private activities in such
manner as to outrage or to cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of
ordinary sensibilities."
91. 18 N.J. Misc. 633, 16 A.2d 80 (1940).
92. Id. at 90. Although the taking of a blood sample is clearly at invasion of a privacy
interest, today modem civil discovery would allow for court ordered physical examinations
including such test. See FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
93. 780 F.2d 1067 (1st. Cir. 1986).
94. 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987). Quoted with approval by the United States
Supreme Court in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1413
(1989).
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Urinalysis, as an invasion of the seclusion of another, was specifi-
cally addressed inJennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc..95 InJennings, the
plaintiff brought suit against her employer seeking injunctive relief to
prevent required drug testing by urinalysis. Although the court found
that the cause of action for invasion of privacy was barred by the plain-
tiff's consent, 9 6 the court characterized the plaintiff's common law right
to right to privacy, "to be free of any unwarranted intrusion into-her
private affairs," '9 7 as undeniable.
A person's right to privacy can also be violated when his private life
is exposed to unreasonable publicity. To constitute an invasion, the dis-
closure must involve private facts that are highly offensive and objec-
tionable to the public.9 8
A headline such as "star quarterback not to play in big game after
team takes drug test" could fall within the meaning of the restatement as
to publicity given to private life. Most university programs indicate that
drug testing results are for use by team personnel or by the player's
family only.9 9 However, the imposition of team or school sanctions may
be as revealing to the press as direct access to the information. The
fishbowl existence of the "major" college athlete results in little privacy
for the athlete. At the same time there are few things that can be more
damaging to the professional career of an athlete than to be associated
with drugs. Witness the fate of the Canadian runner Ben Johnson. 100
The Massachusetts Supreme Court considered the issue of public
disclosure of private facts regarding the drug testing of student-athletes
in Bally v. Northeastern University. 101 Although the plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion arose under a Massachusetts statute, as opposed to common law,
the court construed a claim to exist only if there is a public dissemina-
tion of information. The plaintiff failed to present any evidence that in-
formation regarding his participation in drug testing was exposed to the
public.
The university again escaped liability in Bilney v. Evening Star Newspa-
per.10 2 In Bilney six basketball team members brought suit as result of a
story that appeared concerning their academic standing. Like drug test-
ing information, actual academic performance is considered confiden-
tial. The plaintiffs' cause of action against the newspaper failed because
the information was divulged by an unnamed source at the university
and not the newspaper.
95. 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
96. See infra notes 103-112 and accompanying text.
97. Jennings, 765 S.W.2d at 500.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1976) provides:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
99. See Appendix A and B.
100. See Ben Johnson Worlds Fastest Scapegoat, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1988, at A27.
101. 403 Mass. 713, 532 N.E.2d 49 (1989).
102. 43 Md. App. 560, 406 A.2d 652 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
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It is likely that the issues confronted by the courts in Bally and Bilney
will arise again without the impediments encountered by the plaintiffs in
those cases. When they do, the court will have to determine what signif-
icance, if any to give to signed consent.
B. Signed Consent and Tort Liability
As noted earlier, consent, if valid, will bar recovery in tort.'
0 3
Whether the consent to drug testing discussed above will be viewed as
effective in tort, depends on the considerations of several factors.
Consent, for the purpose of excusing tort liability, is defined as a
willingness for conduct to occur that is manifested by action or inac-
tion. 104 Consent embodies the concept of volenti nonfit injuria, '0 5 and as
such falls within the realm of assumption of risk.
To be effective, consent must not be the product of duress.' 0 6 The
tort concept of duress would appear to be broader than the contract
definition. 10 7 Consent was found to be a bar to a right to privacy claim
in Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, 10 8 regarding an employment re-
quired drug testing program. However, Jennings apparently did not
claim that her consent was the result of duress or that it was in any way
involuntary.
There is a close relationship between consent and assumption of
risk. This close relationship raises a significant issue of whether public
policy concerns, sufficient to void express assumption of risk agree-
ments, will also nullify similar express consent provisions.
In Tunkl v. Regents of University of California,10 9 the court confronted
a signed release that sought to shield the defendant medical center from
all liability arising from the negligence or wrongful acts of its employees.
The court found that such provisions were against public policy if (1) the
subject of the agreement involved a business generally suitable for pub-
lic regulation, (2) the party seeking exculpation is involved in providing
a service of great importance to the public, (3) the party seeking excul-
pation possesses a decisive advantage in bargaining position, and (4) the
person seeking this service places himself under the control of the party
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1977).
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 (1977) states:
(1) Consent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur. It may be manifested by
action or inaction and need not be communicated to the actor.
(2) If words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended as
consent, they constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact.
105. To one who is willing no harm is done.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B (3) (1977).
107. Unlike the contract definition discussed above, tort duress applies to any conduct
of the actor which constrains another's will and makes the giving of consent involuntary.
Comment j. to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B (1977) states:
Duress is constraint of another's will by which he is compelled to give consent
when he is not in reality willing to do so. Persuasion amounting to a form of
constraint can take various forms and many of them, commonly encountered in
daily life, are without legal effect and are not normally characterized as duress.
108. 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
109. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441 (1963).
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seeking exculpation.' 10
The transition from exculpatory clause to consent was made in Beeck
v. Tucson General Hospital,I I where a surgical consent signed by the
plaintiff, prior to surgery, which stated that all doctors providing serv-
ices were independent contractors was held invalid under the Tunkl
principle. 112
If a similar transition between exculpatory clause and signed con-
sent is made regarding university required consent to drug test, then
Tunkl may pose significant problems regarding the enforcement of that
consent in a right to privacy action.
The applicability of Tunkl is limited to the type of business that is
generally suitable for public regulation. The defendant in Tunkl was a
university and, like all universities was subject to considerable regula-
tion. The importance of the university to the athlete and the public in
general, as a source of education is great. The decisive advantage of the
bargaining position of the university vis-a-vis the student has already
been discussed, and indeed forms the heart of the problem. For good
or for ill, the student surely places his or herself in the hands of the
university for their academic and athletic future.
It is by no means certain that signed consent will protect universi-
ties from invasion of privacy liability. Nor is it certain, that the university
will be adequately protected by its current consent policy. What is cer-
tain, is that more thought and planning regarding potential liability be-
yond search and seizures claims must be considered.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the smoke settles from the initial furor over drug testing and its
constitutionality, universities must now consider the impact of the more
traditional legal theories of contracts and torts. The recognition of the
relative lack of bargaining power of the student-athlete, regarding the
significant intrusion of privacy that drug testing creates, leads to serious
problems of oppression and coercion.
The common law doctrines of duress, undue influence and uncon-
scionability are ripe for application in the contract milieu of university-
student transactions. Planning and awareness of these factors may lead
to a more equitable balancing of the relationship.
The significant interests of privacy must not be assumed to have no
life beyond the constitutional inquiry. The common law protection of
privacy may provide greater protection for the student than might be
found to exist by constitutional edict. The university must be vigilant in
guarding the confidentiality of the student and at the same time work to
assure a greater role for free choice.
110. Id. at 447.
111. 18Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972).
112. Id. at 167, 500 P.2d at 1155.
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DR UG TESTING OF STUDENT ATHLETES
APPENDIX A
CONSENT TO TESTING OF URINE SAMPLES
AND
AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE PF
INFORMATION
To: Team Physicians
The Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio 43210
I hereby acknowledge that I received a copy of The Ohio State Univer-
sity Intercollegiate Athletics Drug Education Program. I further ac-
knowledge that I have read said program, and that I understand the
provisions of the program.
In consideration for the opportunity to participate in intercollegiate ath-
letics at The Ohio State University, I am entering into this the terms of
this consent and authorization.
I do hereby give my consent to have a sample of my urine collected
during the school year of 1986-87, and testing for the presence of cer-
tain drugs or substances in accordance with the provisions of The Ohio
State University Intercollegiate Athletics Drug Testing Program. I also
consent to have a sample of my urine collected and tested at such other
times as analysis testing is required under the program during the aca-
demic year. I further authorize you to act as my physician for the limited
purpose of conducting analysis testing under the program and agree
that you may make a confidential release of the results of the testing to
the head athletic trainer at The Ohio State University; my parent(s) or
legal guardian; the head coach of any intercollegiate sport of which I am
a member; and the athletic director of The Ohio State University. To
the extent set forth in this document, I waive any privilege I might have
in connection with such information.
I understand any urine samples will be sent to the Clinical Laboratory at
The Ohio State University Hospital, for actual testing.
In consideration for the opportunity to participate in intercollegiate ath-
letics at The Ohio State University, I also release from legal responsibil-
ity or liability The Ohio State University, its Board of Trustees, its
officers, employees, representatives, and agents for the release of such
information and records as authorized by this form.
Signature Date
Name (Please Print)
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APPENDIX B
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROGRAM
ADOPTED BY THE A.A. BOARD OF DIRECTORS AT A
SPECIAL MEETING - MAY 23, 1985
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROGRAM AND LIMITED WAIVER OF
CONFIDENTIALITY
I, , a student at the University of Illinois, Urbana Campus,
as a condition to participating in the Intercollegiate Athletic Program
conducted under the auspices of the Athletic Association, do hereby
consent to participate in the Substance Abuse Program. I acknowledge
that I have received, read and understand the policy statement concern-
ing this program, which includes provisions for testing through non-in-
vasive procedures for the presence of substances, education and
counselling with regard to substance abuse, and disciplinary sanctions
which might be imposed as a result of this program if it is determined
that I have violated the provisions and intent of the policy.
Further, I understand that as part of the program, the results of this
testing may be disclosed to the coaching staff, the support staff and to
my parent(s) or legal guardian(s) as provided for in the program state-
ment. I also understand that my participation in intercollegiate athletics
is conditioned upon my full and good faith participation and coopera-
tion in all aspects of the program including testing, education, counsel-
ling and rehabilitation.
I further expressly waive any rights under applicable state or federal
laws, or University policy, including but not limited to The Family Edu-
cation and Privacy Act (20 USC 1232g), the physician-patient privilege,
to the confidentiality of the information and documents resulting from
my participation in this program, to the extent that disclosures are made
as pursuant to the program statement. It is understood that the infor-
mation will not be available to any other person without first obtaining
my consent.
Signed this day of , 19.
Witness Student
[Vol. 67:2
